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1980, all arising out of the dissolution of their business association in 1980.
In the present litigation, Fiberglass sought to introduce the testimony of
Dupuy's attorney, which included statements made to Krauss's lawyer in
the course of prior litigation. Dupuy moved for a protective order, and the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted
Dupuy's motion. The district court found that an attorney had made the
statements in the context of settlement negotiations, and the statements,
therefore, were inadmissible under rule 408.
Fiberglass appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court
improperly excluded the testimony at issue. To determine whether the district
court's exclusion of the statements was clearly erroneous, the Fourth Circuit
began its discussion of the case by reviewing rule 408, which excludes from
evidence all statements made in the course of settlement negotiations. In
deciding whether rule 408 covered the statements, the Fourth Circuit inquired
into whether the parties intended the statements to be part of the negotiations
for compromise. Finding that the district court considered the evidence at
four separate hearings and determining that the parties made these state-
ments during settlement discussions, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court's decision was not clearly erroneous. To encourage settlement and to
foster frank discussions, the Fourth Circuit recognized the need to make
settlement negotiations inadmissible. The Fourth Circuit stated that, for rule
408 to have any effect, attorneys must be afforded wide latitude in the
conduct of settlement negotiations. Fiberglass claimed that, even if the
statements were made in the course of settlement discussions, the district
court should have admitted these statements under rule 408 for "other
purposes." Stating that the district court's decision on this issue would not
be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion amounting to manifest
error, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in holding these statements to be inadmissible.
Fiberglass also argued that rule 408 does not bar admission of the
testimony at issue because the parties did not offer the statements to prove
liability on the claims decided by the settlements. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that, while the present suit was grounded in antitrust and the prior
lawsuits were not, the claims presented were simply matters arising from
the same litigation and represented the continuing feud between Krauss and
Dupuy. The Fourth Circuit, consequently, decided that the present suit, like
the prior suits, arose out of the same transaction, the breakup of the Krauss
and Dupuy business relationship. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held in Dupuy
that a court may exclude statements that attorneys have made in the course
of settlement negotiations. According to the Fourth Circuit, courts should
exclude such evidence if the present suit arises out of the same transaction
as the settlement and if the settlement negotiations are between the same
parties to the suit at hand.
DEFAMATION AND LIBEL
In De Leon v. Saint Joseph Hospital, Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 87 (1989), the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Fourth Circuit considered whether a hospital and the hospital's chief of
surgery had defamed a physician by denying the physician's application for
hospital admitting privileges. In De Leon the defendant hospital, Saint
Joseph Hospital (the Hospital), employed the plaintiff physician, Jose S.
De Leon, M.D., as a resident and later as a house surgeon. The Hospital
allowed De Leon only limited medical privileges. Specifically, De Leon could
not admit patients to the Hospital and could treat patients only under
another physician's supervision. After one year's employment at the Hos-
pital, De Leon applied for privileges to admit patients to the Hospital
without supervision. When making his application, De Leon signed a form
release that absolved from any civil liability arising from the application
process the Hospital, the Hospital's agents, and persons providing infor-
mation to the Hospital pursuant to the application.
As part of the application process, the Hospital's Credentials Committee
solicited from the Hospital's Chief of Surgery, William L. Macon, IV,
M.D., an assessment of De Leon's qualifications. Macon responded with a
letter containing statements about De Leon's ability and performance, along
with Macon's conclusion that De Leon was unqualified to hold admitting
privileges at the Hospital. Accordingly, Macon recommended in his letter
that the Hospital deny De Leon's application.
After receiving Macon's recommendation, the Hospital proceeded to
evaluate De Leon's application. During the evaluation process, three Hos-
pital committees independently considered De Leon's application, deter-
mined that De Leon's credentials were unsatisfactory, and recommended
denial of De Leon's application. Subsequently, the full Board of Trustees
of the Hospital (the Board), the body that made the Hospital's final decisions
on medical privilege applications, denied both De Leon's initial application
and De Leon's subsequent appeal for rehearing on the grounds that De
Leon's credentials were unsatisfactory.
In response to the Board's refusal to grant De Leon's application, De
Leon filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
a suit against Macon and the Hospital, alleging in part that the Hospital
and Macon had defamed De Leon in connection with the denial of De
Leon's application. In alleging defamation De Leon claimed that Macon,
in his assessment letter to the board, made malicious and intentionally false
statements about De Leon and that the Hospital intentionally had denied
De Leon's application on the basis of Macon's false statements. Specifically,
De Leon claimed that Macon made seven false statements regarding De
Leon's ability and performance as a physician. In response to De Leon's
claims the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all counts,
and the district court granted the defendants' motions. De Leon then
appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the defamation
claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In considering De Leon's appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
district court relied on four distinct grounds for granting summary judgment.
First, the district court held that the release from civil liability that De Leon
executed at the time of De Leon's application barred De Leon's claims.
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Second, the district court held that, because the allegedly defamatory
material was not published, De Leon's claims legally were insufficient.
Third, the district court held that, even if defamatory, Macon's statements
were privileged under Maryland law. Finally, the district court held that
Macon's statements were not defamatory. The Fourth Circuit stated that
any one of these four grounds, if upheld on appeal, provides a basis to
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
In reviewing the district court's first holding that the release barred De
Leon's claims, the Fourth Circuit noted that under Maryland law parties
contractually may exculpate themselves from any liability not arising from
willful and wanton conduct. De Leon claimed that, because Macon allegedly
made malicious and intentionally false statements about De Leon, and that
because the Hospital intentionally denied De Leon's application on the basis
of Macon's statements, the Hospital and Macon each were guilty of willful
and wanton conduct sufficient to make the release ineffective. However,
after review of seven allegedly false statements Macon made in his letter to
the Credentials Committee, the Fourth Circuit found De Leon's showing
of the falsity of these statements limited to conclusory allegations. Accord-
ingly, the court stated that De Leon failed to prove that the defendants
engaged in the extreme, wanton behavior necessary to make the release
ineffective. Thus, because De Leon failed to provide any support for the
allegations of intent or wantonness, the Fourth Circuit stated that the release
precluded De Leon from recovery.
In reviewing the district court's second holding that the allegedly de-
famatory statements never were published, the Fourth Circuit noted that
under Maryland law, for a defamation claim a plaintiff must show an
unprivileged publication to a third party. De Leon claimed that, because
De Leon will have to reveal the Hospital's decision if De Leon applies for
another position, the Hospital's action compels De Leon to engage in self-
publication of the Hospital's decision. However, the Fourth Circuit rejected
De Leon's self-publication argument, stating that Maryland law does not
recognize the self-publication theory. Consequently, because the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the Hospital never published to any third party the
Hospital's decision on De Leon's application, the Fourth Circuit held that
De Leon's defamation claim was insufficient.
In reviewing the district court's third holding that Macon's communi-
cations were privileged, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, even if Macon's
statements to other Hospital officials technically constituted publication, no
actionable publication had occurred because Macon's communications en-
joyed a qualified privilege. The Fourth Circuit determined that Macon's
statements were privileged under two Maryland statutory provisions that
grant good faith immunity to persons who give information to a medical
review committee. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit determined that Macon's
statements were privileged under a Maryland common-law rule that grants
immunity to communications arising in an employment context or by a
common interest in the subject matter of the communication. The court
said that De Leon could overcome the statutory and common-law privileges
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only by showing that Macon knew his statements were false or that Macon
acted with reckless disregard as to the statements' truth. In determining
that De Leon had not met the burden of showing intentional falsity the
Fourth Circuit relied on the court's earlier discussion of De Leon's failure
to make such a showing. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the defendants' statements were privileged.
In reviewing the district court's fourth holding that Macon's statements
were not defamatory, the Fourth Circuit noted that many of the allegedly
defamatory statements were Macon's opinion and were labelled as such.
The Fourth Circuit further noted that De Leon's denial or explanation of
the incident consistently accompanied each of Macon's statements which
reported a factual incident. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Macon's
statements were not defamatory. Accordingly, because each of the district
court's four grounds for granting summary judgment were sufficient, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the defendants' motion
for summary judgment.
In Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1989),
the Fourth Circuit considered whether Veribanc committed libel against Blue
Ridge Bank by disseminating misleading information about the stability of
the bank. Veribanc is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the generation
and dissemination of information concerning financial institutions based on
data submitted to federal regulatory agencies. In Blue Ridge Bank the
plaintiff, Blue Ridge, alleged that Veribanc distributed a report titled "Fed-
erally Insured U.S. Commercial Banks Which Could Reach Zero Equity
Within One Year" to Dan Dorfman, a nationally syndicated newspaper
columnist. The court found that the report erroneously identified Blue Ridge
as a bank that potentially could reach zero equity within one year. Subse-
quently, the Richmond Times Dispatch published an article by Dorfman
titled "Possible Bank Flops." According to the court, the Dorfman article
identified Blue Ridge as a troubled bank based on the Veribanc report.
Veribanc did not dispute that it mistakenly included Blue Ridge in the
report. Veribanc explained that the mistake resulted from Blue Ridge's
midyear conversion from a savings and loan institution to a bank. As a
result of the conversion, Veribanc erroneously annualized Blue Ridge's year-
to-date loss. Blue Ridge reported a year-to-date loss figure that included
Blue Ridge's performance as a savings and loan. Veribanc admittedly
reported the year-to-date loss figure of the savings and loan and bank
entirely as a fourth quarter loss during Blue Ridge's operation as a bank.
Consequently, the court found that the Veribanc loss calculations projected
unsubstantiated financial problems for the bank.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
found that Blue Ridge was a public figure and, therefore, had to show
actual malice on the part of Veribanc to prove libel. Applying that standard,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Blue Ridge for $600,000. Veribanc
appealed the liability determination and the assessment of damages. Blue
Ridge cross-appealed the district court's decision that the bank, as a public
figure, had to prove actual malice.
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To resolve the issues, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether Ver-
ibanc's defamatory statements were expressions of opinion or statements of
fact. According to the court, expressions of opinion are not actionable as
libel because the United States Constitution protects such statements under
the first amendment. Therefore, the court explained, if the defamatory
statement was an expression of opinion rather than a declaration of fact,
the district court should have entered judgment for the defendant.
The Fourth Circuit applied a two-pronged test to determine whether
the Veribanc statement was fact rather than opinion. First, the court
considered whether the court objectively could characterize the challenged
statement as true or false. If not, according to the court, the statement was
an opinion and Blue Ridge had no cause of action against Veribanc. If the
court could characterize the statement as true or false, then the court would
proceed to apply the second prong of the test. The court explained that
under the second prong the statement still could be an opinion and,
therefore, nonactionable, depending on the author's choice of words, the
context of the challenged statement within the writing, and the broader
social context into which the statement fits. Addressing the first prong, the
Fourth Circuit determined that Veribanc's statement was subject to a true
or false classification because the Blue Ridge loss figures were either accurate
or they were inaccurate. Next, considering the factors of the second prong,
the court determined that the statement was an actionable statement of fact.
In the court's analysis, the words in Veribanc's statement did not alert the
reader that the statement was something other than a factual declaration.
Also, according to the court, the statement did not give any indication of
alternative meaning when read in the context of the whole report. Finally,
the court found no relationship between Veribanc and Blue Ridge suggesting
a social context that should alert the reader to possible distortions in the
Veribanc report. Therefore, the court held that Veribanc's report was an
actionable statement of fact.
The Fourth Circuit next looked to the appropriate standard for imposing
liability for libel. According to the court, Veribanc's liability depended on
whether Blue Ridge was a public or private figure. The court stated that if
Blue Ridge was a public figure, Blue Ridge had to show actual malice by
clear and convincing proof. However, the court noted that if Blue Ridge
was a private figure, Blue Ridge had to prove negligence only by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The Fourth Circuit considered two factors in determining whether Blue
Ridge was a public figure or a private figure. The first factor was Blue
Ridge's access to the media. The second factor that the court considered
was the extent to which Blue Ridge invited public comment and attention.
The court noted that this second factor was a more important factor than
the first factor. The Fourth Circuit further explained that the court must
distinguish between public figures who assume a general risk of defamatory
comment (general purpose public figures) and those who assume such a risk
with respect only to certain topics (limited purpose public figures). According
to the court, a figure is a general purpose public figure if the figure occupies
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a position of such persuasive power, influence, fame, or notoriety that the
figure assumes special prominence in the resolution of public questions.
But, according to the court, whether the figure becomes a limited purpose
public figure depends on whether the figure thrusts itself into the public
eye in a specific controversy. Under this analysis, the Fourth Circuit found
no evidence to suggest that Blue Ridge had the media influence necessary
to elevate it to a general purpose public figure. Further, the court perceived
no grounds for finding Blue Ridge a limited purpose public figure.
The court expressly rejected Veribanc's allegation that Blue Ridge was
a public figure because the bank voluntarily injected itself into a pre-existing
controversy concerning the bank's financial health. Veribanc alleged that a
pre-existing controversy existed over the bank's financial health resulting
from Blue Ridge's local economic importance and Blue Ridge's participation
in a government regulated industry of economic importance. The Fourth
Circuit, however, rejected the argument that a business enterprise loses the
protection of defamation law simply as a result of being subject to pervasive
government regulation. The court reasoned that such an approach would
replace the two-pronged analysis with a single consideration of whether the
defendant was engaged in a regulated activity of community importance.
According to the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff becomes a limited purpose
public figure only if a predefamation public controversy exists in which the
plaintiff becomes directly involved. In this case, the court held that no
specific preexisting public controversy directly or proximately concerned
Blue Ridge's solvency. Therefore, the court found no adequate basis for
concluding that Blue Ridge was either a general or limited purpose public
figure.
Because the Fourth Circuit held that Blue Ridge was not a public figure,
Blue Ridge had to prove Veribanc's negligence only by a preponderance of
the evidence. According to the Fourth Circuit, the jury's determination of
liability in the district court under the higher standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence of actual malice subsumed a determination that Veribanc
was liable under a preponderance negligence standard. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury's liability determination.
The Fourth Circuit then rejected Veribanc's remaining allegations. Ver-
ibanc challenged the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the law
of republication. According to the court, an originator of a defamation is
liable for republication only if the republication is the natural and probable
consequence of the originator's act. The Fourth Circuit held, however, that
the Richmond Times Dispatch article was not an unnatural or improbable
consequence of Veribanc's publication, nor an unnatural or improbable
result of Veribanc's decision to furnish the Veribanc report to the news-
paper's reporter. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Richmond Times
article did not fundamentally distort the information in the Veribanc report
and, further, that Veribanc authorized the use of any factual statements
contained in the report.
Veribanc next challenged the district court's admission of expert testi-
mony concerning the future lost profits of Blue Ridge. According to Fourth
